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The pending case of Philippines v. China before the International Court
of Arbitration concerns the two countries’ claims for territory and economic
rights in the South China Sea, an area said to be the fiercest-contested in Asia.
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan, and Malaysia all have
overlapping claims in it.1 The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest
maritime routes with more than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage
and a third of all maritime traffic.2 It is also rich in fish stocks as well as oil and
gas deposits. 3 The fight for control of the South China Sea is therefore the fight
for power. For China, control of the waters could mean a Chinese regional
hegemony,4 for others, e.g. Vietnam, it could mean resistance from such
hegemony, which Vietnam sees as historically dangerous.5
In recent years, to cement its position and further its ambition, China has
built seven artificial islets over uninhabited reefs and shoals as well as exerted
significant military control over the area surrounding them.6 China also believes
that it controls 80 or 90 percent of the 1.35 million square-mile sea that falls
within the “nine-dashed line,” a feature drawn on Chinese maps by its Nationalist
government in 1947.7 China is projected to outspend the United States in military
and especially in the naval forces, “outbuilding the U.S. in new submarines by
four to one.”8 If China prevails in this conflict, it would have even more
influence on trade, and along the way, help advance its international prowess
greatly into the 21st century.9 East Asia expert Robert Kaplan compares the

importance of the South China Sea to China to that of the Caribbean Sea to the
U.S. where gaining complete naval dominance in the Caribbean Sea has given
the U.S. hegemonic influence over the Caribbean states and a significant part of
South America.10 Now, China wishes to do the same with East and Southeast
Asia.
The U.S., China’s chief economic rival and as the world’s current sole
super-power, also has interests in this case and the South China Sea at large. The
reason for this is two-fold: first, the U.S. has an interest in protecting a “legal,
rule-based order enshrining a freedom of navigation.”11 The second reason is
strictly political: the U.S. does not trust China and is fearful of Chinese
dominance in Asia,12 a region which, according to President Barack Obama,
“represents the future.”13 It is the same reason the President has used to justify
the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.14 However, while the U.S. is critical
of China for not abiding by international law, and in this case, the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it has also been accused of
hypocrisy and undue interference, among other things.15 In fact the U.S. has not
yet ratified UNCLOS itself, despite Hillary Clinton and the Obama
administration’s push for the Senate to do so.16
Although the Philippines do not contest with China as much maritime
territory as Vietnam and Taiwan, it also seeks to prevent a “Chinese westward
push at its expenses.17 It is unsurprising that as the weaker state in this conflict, it
seeks adjudication in an international court. It also perceives very strongly,
however, that UNCLOS grants it territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
vital to its economy, and the sea operates as national security, trade channels,
fishing grounds, and especially the oil reserves within the perceived EEZ.18 The
Philippines cannot get what it wants by competing arms with China, because it
does not have the competitive resources to do so, not without help from the
U.S.19 Therefore, diplomacy and international law have become the Philippines’
primary strategic focus.20
Hypothetically, the Philippines could have brought this case before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the most powerful international tribunal.
However, for the ICJ to gain jurisdiction, the parties have to agree.21 It is unlikely
China would subject itself to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, or any court’s jurisdiction,
because its legal arguments are meritless.
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Given China’s utmost unwillingness for this matter to be adjudicated,22
the only way for the Philippines, and potentially other rival claimants, to bring a
court case is by utilizing the dispute settlement mechanism in UNCLOS.23
Because both the Philippines and China are parties to the Convention (the
Philippines ratified it on May 8, 1984 and China on June 7, 1996), they are both
bound by the dispute settlement procedures provided for in Part XV of the
Convention in respect of any dispute between them concerning the interpretation
or application of the Convention.24

THE PCA JURISDICTION AWARD
The Philippines, whose head counsel – Mr. Paul Reichler – is something
of a legend. Mr. Reichler won the landmark case Nicaragua v. United States
before the ICJ, and on January 22, 2015, he filed suit against China at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).25 After hearings conducted from July 7,
2015 to July 15, 2015, the PCA ruled on jurisdiction.26 The Tribunal for the PCA
held that the case “was properly constituted” and that “the Philippines’ act of
initiating this arbitration did not constitute an abuse of process.”27 The case was
properly constituted because: first, any “dispute concerning the interpretation or
application” of UNCLOS is to be resolved by a court which has jurisdiction,28
and second, the PCA was a court explicitly listed in the Convention as having
jurisdiction.29
China has repeatedly asserted its position that it will not participate in the
proceedings, because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over China’s “territorial
sovereignty” in the South China Sea.30 This position is unreasonable and is
widely unpopular.31 For example, in its efforts to sabotage the Philippines’ legal
arguments, China argued that the PCA’s jurisdiction was exempted from the
Convention, because the Philippines was committing an “abuse of process.”32
China said that the Philippines abused the Arbitration mechanism under
UNCLOS, because it unilaterally initiated the proceedings without first
exhausting diplomatic channels.33 Essentially, China wanted the Philippines to
continue using negotiations exclusively for this dispute.
However, the Tribunal rejected China’s arguments. The Tribunal
acknowledged the Philippines had sought to negotiate with China, but said that
international law does not require a State to continue negotiations “when it
concludes that the possibility of a negotiated solution has been exhausted.”34
3

Although Article 283 of UNCLOS mandates the two parties in a dispute to go
through an “exchange of views” before going to the court,35 the Tribunal found
ample evidence that the Philippines and China have “exchanged views” but could
not, and would likely not, come up with a mutually satisfactory results.36
The Tribunal, after rigorously examining all other possible recourses
under international law which China claims the Philippines had not
“exhausted”—the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC), the Treaty of Amity, the Convention for Biological Diversity, and other
bilateral treaties between China and the Philippines—concluded none would
preclude the Philippines’ right to compulsory dispute settlement under
UNCLOS.37 The Tribunal noted the dispute settlement provisions in UNCLOS
was heavily negotiated and reflects a compromise, and parties cannot “pick and
choose” after the fact which provisions apply.38 This note implicitly accused
China of violating pacta sunt servanda. 39
According to the Tribunal, however, the jurisdictional issue is not fully
resolved on all of the Philippines’ requests. The PCA has requested the
Philippines clarify a submission and will consider seven specific submissions “in
conjunction with the merits.”40

THE APPLICATION OF UNCLOS
Since the case began, the Philippines had presented its position on fifteen
items relating to the hotly contested and resource-rich waters west of the
Philippines. The Tribunal decided it was the proper body to decide on seven of
the Philippines’ submissions, while seven others are reserved for further
consideration because those issues “do not possess an exclusively preliminary
character.”41 The Philippines was also directed to “clarify the content and narrow
the scope” of its 15th submission which states that “China shall desist from
further unlawful claims and activities.”42 The Tribunal made it clear that the other
fourteen claims, however, will proceed to the merits phase, even if the PCA’s
jurisdiction over seven of those claims is to be decided in conjunction with the
merits.43
Because the pending decision will likely address the merits of all those
claims, it is proper to discuss all of them. There are substantive similarities
between the claims, and the fifteen claims depend on four primary inquiries: (1)
the status of Beijing’s “nine-dash line” sovereignty assertion; (2) the legality of
4

China’s occupation of various features in the South China Sea; (3) the legality of
China’s exploiting natural resources in what the Philippines perceives as its EEZ;
and (4) the legality of China’s interference with the Philippines’ navigation
within its EEZ.
First is the status of Beijing’s nine-dash line claim in the South China
Sea. The Philippines argues the nine-dash line is an excessive maritime claim and
not in line with the entitlements for coastal states under UNCLOS.44 China has
kept the scope of its nine-dash line “rights formed in history” but giving no
elaboration on the legal nature and effect of such rights.45 In China’s view, if it
indeed possesses such rights to certain land features in the South China Sea, its
territorial seas, EEZs, and rights to various maritime features would be
expanded.46

47

Based on the record so far, however, it is likely China’s “historic” ninedash line will be held invalid. The sole “historic” evidence that China has
presented so far is not entirely convincing: it is a map drawn by what was known
as the Republic of China (ROC), before it gained independence and became
Taiwan today.48 There are two problems with this evidence: first, the legitimacy
of the drawn map and “historic rights” associated with it are deeply in question,49
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and second, even if the map is legitimate, who would be the rightful holder of
such “historic rights” to the sea – China or Taiwan?
The second, third, and fourth primary inquiries in this case will be heavily
dependent upon resolution of the first, whether the nine-dash line is an excessive
claim. If it is, the Philippines argues, China’s occupation of various features in
the Spratly, exploitation of natural resources in the Philippines’ EEZ, and
interference with travel in the Philippines’ EEZ are all illegal because such
activities are well beyond China’s territorial seas or EEZs.
If “historic rights” do not apply, then UNCLOS favors the Philippines’
positions in these three issues because first, under UNCLOS, any rights to water
generally attach to territorial ownership of certain land features,50 and second, the
features China is currently occupying and exercising control over will not qualify
as such rights-giving land features. To illustrate, the Convention lists three
different types of features, each giving surrounding waters certain, distinctive
legal effects:
(1) Islands
The first is “island” defined as “a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water and above water at high tide.”51 An island, such as the
entirety of Cuba or of Singapore, entitles the country that owns it to a 12 nautical
mile (approx. 14 miles) territorial sea from the coastline with which it has full
sovereignty.52 A country can exclude foreign entities from its territorial sea.53
The island is also entitled to a 200 nm (approximately 370 km) EEZ
which gives the country the sole right to exploit the resources within it such as
fish, minerals, and oil reserves, if any.54 Articles 60(8) and 80 of UNCLOS
further prescribe that an artificial island constructed in the EEZ or on the
continental shelf “does not possess the status of [an] island.”55 As compared to
the islands specified in Articles 10(2) and 121(2), which could be used as a base
point to measure sea zones, artificial islands within the context of Article 60(8)
“have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental
shelf.”
(2) Rocks or Reefs
The second features are “rocks or reefs” that are mostly below water but
have rocky protrusions above water during high tide.56 The important point under
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UNCLOS states that a maritime feature is a rock if “it cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life on its own.”57 These mostly submerged features are
entitled to only a 12 nm territorial sea and no EEZ.58
(3) Low-tide Elevations
The third type of maritime features called “low-tide elevations” are
submerged rocks and reefs that are not visible above water.59 This type of
maritime feature is not entitled to any territorial sea or EEZ.60
If the features China control at best only amount to “rocks or reefs” then
the territorial issue concerning the “nine-dash line” does not need to be
considered. Unfortunately for China, this seems to be the case. There are eight
maritime features of concern that are currently under the control of China.61 The
first four are low-tide elevations that are completely submerged: Mischief Reef,
Kennan Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef.62 “These are all below water at high
tide. They’re not entitled to anything. No territorial sea, no EEZ. But all of these
four are physically occupied by China.”63 China has constructed concrete
structures on the reefs including helicopter landing pads over the years since
1995 but that does not give them entitlements to the seas around it because they
would still not be considered “islands” in UNCLOS terms.64
The other four are rocks or reefs that are, at most, entitled to only 12 nm.
These are Scarborough shoal, Johnson reef, Cuarteron reef, and Fiery Cross reef.
These are rocks or reefs at best, because they fail the critical inquiry: they cannot
sustain economic life on their own.65 Despite Chinese efforts building artificially
islets to add to the land mass in these shoal and reefs,66 there is no economic life
on those rocks and the only life there is military.67
Because of such circumstances, UNCLOS dictates that “China’s EEZ
extending southward from its coastline gets it comparatively little beyond deep
blue water, with exceptions including Pratas Island, Macclesfield Bank, and
Scarborough Shoal” while “everyone else’s EEZs get them possession of shallow
archipelagic areas near coasts thought to contain energy deposits.”68 The
claimants’ UNCLOS rights could thus be mapped as below:
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69

CONCLUSION
“Maritime features,” which include islands, rocks and reefs, and low-tide
elevations possess complex physical geographic characteristics and a multiplicity
of legal statuses, according to which they generate different maritime rights.
Maritime delimitation therefore creates different legal effects. Although South
China Sea expert Wu Shicun opines that such complexities are incapable of being
regulated only by the Convention, and international judicial practice has yet to
evolve a standard capable of rendering objective judicial determination of the
legal rights and wrongs in such disputed waters,70 what we know for certain is
that any determination on the legal status of maritime features immediately alters
a country’s territorial sovereignty.71 The world is waiting for the PCA decision,
and China will have to respond.
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According to the Philippines College of Law Professor Jay L.
Batongbacal, the jurisdictional decision already stands to benefit China’s rival
Asian states, regardless of the case’s final outcome.72 China’s “nine-dash line”
claim may now be legally discussed, explained, and evaluated by the Tribunal
based on the cumulative statements and explanations of Chinese officials and
academics even if this is done without their direct participation.73 Internationally,
Professor Batongbacal says, this could seriously undermine China’s influence
over South China Sea stakeholders and domestically it could challenge the
credibility of Chinese leadership.74
In the political angle, it will be difficult to reach resolution to this dispute
purely through negotiation channels such as the DOC, as China insists.
Therefore, adjudication is necessary. Negotiations have been and likely will
remain difficult because China has always had unfair realpolitik advantage and
all parties to this dispute are “guilty of playing domestic politics with their
claims.”75 In Vietnam, for example, nationalistic sentiment is strong.76 Aristotle
has taught that “law is intellect without appetite,”77 and since the mass population
has “appetite,” peace may be easier to achieve if they are left out of the equation,
at least in some degree. In the meantime, it is necessary for the U.S. to maintain
its naval check on China in the region.78
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